The Partner as a Third Party Tortfeasor: Liability or Immunity Under the Workmen\u27s Compensation Act by McClanahan, Randy J.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 34 | Number 3
Employment Discrimination: A Title VII Symposium
Symposium: Louisiana's New Consumer Protection
Legislation
Spring 1974
The Partner as a Third Party Tortfeasor: Liability or
Immunity Under the Workmen's Compensation
Act
Randy J. McClanahan
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Randy J. McClanahan, The Partner as a Third Party Tortfeasor: Liability or Immunity Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 34 La. L.
Rev. (1974)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol34/iss3/15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
and that to those multiple obligations mentioned in article 20771'
must be added another type as yet unnamed.
Carolyn Hazel
THE PARTNER AS A THIRD PARTY TORTFEASOR: LIABILITY OR IMMUNITY
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Under the Louisiana workmen's compensation law, the employer
is afforded immunity from suit brought by an injured employee.' In
cases where the injury is caused by a third party tortfeasor who is not
the employer, however, recovery from the employer or his insurer does
not preclude suit by the injured employee against the third party.'
Thus, a plaintiff seeking recovery in workmen's compensation is en-
couraged to have his tortfeasor judicially recognized as a "third
party."3 Various problems may arise, however, when "third party
31. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2077: "Where there are more than one obligor or obligee
named in the same contract, the obligation it may produce may be either several or
joint or in solido, both as regards the obligor and the obligee."
1. "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on
account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chap-
ter shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents, or relations." LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950). See also Comment,
33 LA. L. REV. 325 (1973).
2. "When an injury for which compensation is payable under this Chapter has
been sustained under circumstances creating in some person (in this Section referred
to as third person) other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages in respect
thereto, the injured employee or his dependent may claim compensation under this
Chapter and the payment or award of compensation hereunder shall not affect the
claim or right of action of the injured employee or his dependent against such third
person, . . . and such injured employee or his dependent may obtain damages from
or proceed at law against such third person to recover damages for the injury." LA. R.S.
23:1101 (1950).
3. Assuming plaintiffs only recourse for injuries is workmen's compensation, his
potential for recovery is severely limited by statute. For example, the maximum com-
pensation allowed is $65.00 per week for a period of 500 weeks if the injury causes death
or permanent disability. LA. R.S. 23:1202 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No.
71; LA. R.S. 23:1221 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess. No. 25 § 5; LA.
R.S. 23:1231 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, Ex. Sess. No. 25 § 6.
Medical expenses are generally limited to $12,500.00. LA. R.S. 23:1203 (1950), as
amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 322 § 1; 1956, No. 282 § 1; 1968, No. 103 § 1.
On the other hand, if plaintiff is successful in arguing that his tortfeasor is a third
party not his employer, he may recover both workmen's compensation from his em-
ployer, and he may additionally recover an amount virtually unlimited in tort from
his tortfeasor. ("[Tlhe payment or award of compensation hereunder shall not .. .
NOTES
party" status is sought to be attached to a natural or juridical person
occupying two or more separate but contemporaneous roles.
In Leger v. Townsend4 the court considered whether a partner of
a partnership covered by the Workmen's Compensation Statute can
be sued as a third party on an injury arising out of the partnership
enterprise.5 In that case, it was held that the partner could not be
sued as a third party unless he was shown to be a co-employee of the
injured employee.' The question was again considered in Cockerham
v. Consolidated Underwriters' and Bersuder v. New Orleans Public
Service, Inc.,' where the courts of appeal in each case followed the
reasoning of Leger. To date, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has
denied writs.' Consequently, based upon the composite holdings of
Leger, Cockerham and Bersuder, a partner is not a "third party"
under the Workmen's Compensation Statute unless he is an "em-
ployee" of the partnership." For a partner to be recognized as an
employee of the partnership he must show that he was "under a
contract of employment, whereby he received wages or some other
specific remuneration from the partnership in addition to his share
of the profits as a partner."' 2
be regarded as establishing a measure of damages for the injury. LA. R.S.
23:1101 (1950)).
4. 257 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), writ refused, 261 La. 464, 259 So. 2d
914 (1972).
5. Id. at 762. The injury was clearly compensable under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Statute, hence plaintiff, in an effort to increase his recovery to a greater
amount than that limited by statute, was seeking to have the partner judicially recog-
nized as a third party tortfeasor under LA. R.S. 23:1101 (1950). This would have
enabled plaintiff to recover in tort for the partner's nonfeasance, in addition to the
$15,000 he had received in compensation benefits. 257 So. 2d 761, 762.
6. Id. at 763.
7. 262 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), writ refused, 262 La. 315, 263 So. 2d 49
(1972).
8. 273 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
9. Bersuder v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 273 So. 2d 46, 48 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973); Cockerham v. Consolidated Under., 262 So. 2d 119, 122 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
10. "Writ denied. The judgment is correct." Cockerham v. Consolidated Under.,
262 La. 315, 263 So. 2d 49 (1972). "Application is denied; the result is correct." Leger
v. Townsend, 261 La. 464, 259 So. 2d 914 (1972).
11. The practical implications of the courts' conclusion become readily apparent:
Because the partner is not a "third party" his identity as partner is merged with the
identity of the partnership and he enjoys the employer's immunity from actions in tort
by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
12. Carpenter v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 159 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964). As authority for the requirement that the partner draw a wage in order to be
classified as an "employee," the courts rely largely on the Carpenter decision. There
is some authority, however, for the proposition that a partner is an employee of the
1974]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
Under Louisiana's civil law system, the partnership is a separate
and distinct entity from its partners. In Trappey v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co., 3 plaintiff was both partner and employee of
the partnership. Upon sustaining injuries in the course of his employ-
ment, he sought recovery under the partnership's workmen's compen-
sation policy. Although prior jurisprudence held that a partner could
not be both employer and employee under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, the court awarded recovery because plaintiff was an em-
ployee of the partnership entity." Since the Trappey decision, the
entity theory of partnership has become firmly embedded in Louis-
iana law."' As a legal entity, the partnership is:
partnership solely by virtue of the fact that he receives remuneration in terms of a
percentage of the partnership profits. (See note 20 infra). Such an approach would
seem to be completely consistent with Louisiana's entity theory of partnership. (See
note 15 infra). Nevertheless, this proposition was expressly rejected in Carpenter. The
rule remains that if the partner is to be considered an employee, he must receive a wage
or some other specific remuneration; his share of the profits alone is not sufficient.
13. 229 La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515 (1956).
14. Prior to the Trappey decision there were apparently only two Louisiana cases
dealing with the subject of a partner seeking recovery as employee under the Work-
men's Compensation Act: Dezendorf v. National Casualty Co., 171 So. 160 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1936) and Harper v. Ragus, 62 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953). Based upon
the common law theory of the partnership as an aggregate of its partners, the court
concluded that a partner could not be both employer and employee under the Act.
When the same question was presented to the First Circuit in Trappey, however,
the court rejected the common law authority supporting Dezendorf, and found that in
Louisiana, based upon its civil law traditions, the partner was an entity separate and
apart from its partners. Consequently, the partner could be both partner and employee
of the partnership, and was allowed recovery in workmen's compensation. Trappey v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 77 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
Since the Second Circuit's decisions in Dezendorf and Harper conflicted with the
First Circuit's decision in Trappey, the Louisiana supreme court granted certiorari. Its
decision was to affirm the conclusion reached by the First Circuit; the "common law"
aggregate theory of partnership was rejected, and the civilian concept of the partner-
ship as a separate entity was adopted. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229
La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515 (1956). See note 15 infra.
15. The Louisiana entity theory of partnership, as stated in Trappey, has received
summary acceptance in civil cases. See, e.g., Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Adolph, 379
F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Morales, 256 La. 940, 945 n.3, 240 So. 2d 714, 716
n.3 (1970); Sugar v. State, 243 La. 217, 223, 142 So. 2d 401, 403 (1962); Johnson v.
Johnson, 235 La. 226, 239, 103 So. 2d 263, 267 (1958); Kline v. Dawson, 230 La. 901,
912, 89 So. 2d 385, 389 (1956); Meyers v. Southwest Region Conf. Ass'n. of Seventh
Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 325, 88 So. 2d 381, 386 (1956); Manuel v. Jennings Lbr.
Co., 231 So. 2d 458, 460 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Apex Sales Co. v. Abraham, 201 So.
2d 184, 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); R.J. Robinson & Son v. Houston Fire & Cas. Co.,
200 So. 2d 776, 777 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Little v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 169 So.
2d 654, 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Quarles v. Albritton, 116 So. 2d 175, 178 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1959); Modicut v. Rist, 98 So. 2d 268, 269 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). See also
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an abstract ideal being with legal relations separate and distinct
from those of its individual members; . . . 'The partnership once
formed and put into action, becomes, in contemplation of law, a
moral being, distinct from the persons who compile it. It is a civil
person, which has its peculiar rights and attributes. . . .[Tihe
partners are not the owners of the partnership property. The ideal
being thus recognized by a fiction of law, is the owner; it has a
right to control and administer the property, to enable it to fulfil
its legal duties and obligations; and the respective parties, who
associated themselves for the purpose of participating in the prof-
its which may accrue, are not the owners of the property itself,
but of the residuum which may be left from the entire partnership
property, after the obligations of the partnership are dis-
charged.' 6
It is apparent that the conclusions of Leger, Cockerham and Bersuder
run counter to the well-established entity theory. Because the part-
nership is a separate entity from its partners, under the Workmen's
Compensation Act the partner is a separate being from the partner-
ship," and thus cannot consequently obtain the employer's immun-
AM. JUR. Partnership § 114 (1942); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1955-1956 Term-Workmen's Compensation, 17 LA. L. REV. 350 (1957); Fuller,
Taxation of Louisiana Professional Partnerships as Associations, 35 TUL. L. REv. 723,
731 (1961).
There was originally much confusion as to whether the entity theory of partnership
was applicable in criminal cases. The landmark case was State v. Peterson, 232 La.
931, 95 So. 2d 608 (1957), which denied the entity theory, holding that a partner could
not commit theft of partnership funds. See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Criminal Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 120, 121 (1957) (criticiz-
ing Peterson as irreconcilable with the "firmly established" rule of Trappey). Whatever
confusion may have existed, however, was firmly settled with the case of State v.
Morales, 256 La. 940, 240 So. 2d 714 (1970), which specifically overruled Peterson and
held that a partner could commit theft of partnership funds because the partnership
was a legal entity, separate and distinct from the partners in composition thereof. For
a thorough treatment concerning the development of and reasons for the Louisiana
entity theory of partnership, see the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeal in
Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 77 So. 2d 183, 185-89 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954).
16. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 635-36, 86 So. 2d 515,
516-17 (1956) (Emphasis added.)
17. The inability of the courts to find "third party" status on the part of the
partner is made especially difficult to understand when taken in context with the
factual situation of Trappey. When viewed contemporaneously, it appears that the
partner is a "third party" when seeking to recover workmen's compensation as an
employee, but is not a "third party" for purposes of assuming responsibility for his
negligent conduct. See State v. Morales, 256 La. 940, 945 n.3, 240 So. 2d 714, 716 n.3
(1970).
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ity. Such immunity is obtained only as a result of being the employer,
and the shoes of employer are properly worn by the partnership, not
the partner.
The courts have used specious reasoning in implying that liabil-
ity might attach to the partner only if he is also an employee of the
partnership. The Third Circuit suggests in Leger that if the partner
had been a co-employee he would have qualified as a third person
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 8 However, the only reason
a partner can become an employee of the partnership is by virtue of
the fact that the partner is a third person.'9 Consequently, for the
court to conclude that a partner must be an employee to become a
"third person" requires the application of a circuitous argument. 0 A
partner is a third party whether he is an employee or not.
18. Leger v. Townsend, 257 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). See also
Vidrine v. Soileau, 38 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) which said that as an employee
of the partnership, the partner could be sued as a co-employee of the plaintiff, and
the statutory restrictions of the Workmen's Compensation Law would not be available
to him. "While it is true that plaintiff, an employee, cannot sue his employer in a tort
action, there is no reason why he cannot sue another employee of his employer." Id.
at 80. "There is ... no reason, we can see, for exempting one employee from liability
for his torts causing damage to another employee." Id. at 81. The view that if the
partner had been a co-employee, he would have qualified as a "third person" was
summarily adopted in Cockerham v. Consolidated Underwriters, 262 So. 2d 119, 122
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), and Bersuder v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 273 So. 2d
46, 48 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
19. "[Tjhe reason that a partner may be considered an employee of his partner-
ship is that, as Trappey explains, a civil-law partnership is a legal entity or person
separate and distinct from the individual partners who compose it." Manuel v. Jen-
nings Lbr. Co., 231 So. 2d 458, 460 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
20. It is appropriate to mention that an argument can be made for the proposition
that under the entity theory of partnership, a partner is an employee of the partnership
per se. The statute provides a presumption of employee status for purposes of work-
men's compensation: "A person rendering service for another in any trades, businesses
or occupations covered by this Chapter is presumed to be an employee under this
Chapter." LA. R.S. 23:1044 (1950). Under the entity theory, the partner and the part-
nership are separate beings, the partner deriving whatever remuneration he receives
from the partnership. Because the partnership produces monetary or other returns for
the partner, the requirements of R.S. 23:1044 appear to be satisfied, at least insofar
as the working partner is concerned, because the partner is rendering service for
another (the partnership). If this approach is correct, then the working partner, being
an "employee" of the partnership per se, would be responsible as a "third party" even
under the Leger test. Such an approach would eliminate the difficulty found in
Carpenter, which requires the drawing of a wage for the partner to earn co-employee
status, a requirement that is somewhat dubious upon careful analysis. See also Meyers
v. Southwest Region Conf. Ass'n. of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 88 So. 2d
381 (1956); Carpenter v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 159 So. 2d 757, 761 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964) (Tate, J., dissenting); W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 71 (Supp. 1964).
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Although corporate officers and directors are "third parties"
under the compensation statute and thus amenable to suit in tort for
their negligent acts,2 the courts refused to extend the corporate offi-
cer doctrine to render members of a partnership liable in tort for an
injury to a partnership employee compensable under the statute.22 As
justification, the courts pointed out that the partner, unlike the cor-
porate officer, may become personally liable for a portion of the work-
men's compensation benefits to the injured employee.z' This is an
unfortunate distinction. In State v. Peterson24 the Louisiana supreme
court held that a partner who misappropriated funds of the partner-
ship could not be prosecuted for theft because a partner in a commer-
cial partnership could ultimately be liable for all of the debts of the
partnership;25 thus, the taking was not of something belonging to
another. 6 Upon careful reconsideration of the issue, however, the
court specifically overruled Peterson in State v. Morales." The rea-
21. Adams v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). See
also Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
22. Bersuder v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 273 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973); Cockerham v. Consolidated Under., 262 So. 2d 119, 121 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
23. "There are vast distinctions in the status of a corporate officer or director and
a member of a partnership. Corporate officers and directors cannot, as a general rule,
become personally liable for any debts or obligations of the corporation. They would
not, therefore, personally pay any portion of workmen's compensation benefits to the
injured employee. To the contrary, the individual partners of an ordinary partnership
as herein involved are individually responsible for their pro rate share of the partner-
ship debts. La. Civ. Code art. 2873. Should the partnership assets be insufficient to
pay a compensation claimant, then the ordinary partners would be jointly liable for
this indebtedness. Citation omitted." Cockerham v. Consolidated Under., 262 So. 2d
119, 121 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Bersuder v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 273 So. 2d
46, 47 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
24. 232 La. 931, 95 So. 2d 608 (1957).
25. "Ordinary partners are not bound in solido for the debts of the partnership,
and no one of them can bind his partners, unless they have given him power so to do,
either specially or by the articles of partnership. Commercial partners are bound in
s(,ido for the debts of the partnership." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2872.
26. "Although the liability of the individual partners of a commercial partnership
comes into existence and becomes enforceable after the dissolution of the partnership,
it follows that they are still eventually liable for unpaid partnership debts. Since the
liability is in solido, any commercial partner is faced with the eventual obligation of
having to pay all outstanding claims against a dissolved partnership ...
"Therefore, if a man can be held liable for an entire debt of a commercial partner-
ship of which he is a member, the commercial partnership cannot be classed as 'an-
other' apart from himself." State v. Peterson, 232 La. 931, 940, 95 So. 2d 608, 612
(1957).
27. 256 La. 940, 240 So. 2d 714 (1970). See also The Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Criminal Law & Procedure, 18 LA. L. REv. 119
(1957); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-
Partnership, 32 LA. L. REV. 232 (1972); Note, 32 TuL. L. REV. 120 (1957).
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soning in Morales indicated a recognition that although the partner
may ultimately be personally liable for all or part of the partnership
debt, the primary obligation is owed solely by the partnership entity,
not the partners individually.28 As a result, the partnership was found
to be a separate entity - "another" - from which the crime of theft
could be committed.
Regardless of whether the partnership is ordinary or commer-
cial,"8 any personal liability the partners may ultimately incur is
secondary, and as such only becomes enforceable when the partner-
ship entity becomes insolvent.3' By basing the distinction between
the corporate officer and a member of a partnership on this secondary
liability of the partner for his solidary or pro rata share of the partner-
ship debts, the courts are returning to the reasoning of the Peterson
case which was specifically declared to be incorrect by the supreme
court in Morales. Consistent analysis indicates that a partnership is
a legal entity entirely separate and distinct from the persons who
compose it and may have its own creditors and debtors." The partner
becomes personally liable to those creditors only when the partner-
ship assets are insufficient to meet its obligations. 2
28. "In Louisiana, during the existence of a partnership its assets are not held in
indivision by the partners, and the partners are not coproprietors of the assets; rather,
the assets belong to a single owner, the fictitious person, the partnership. We specifi-
cally overrule State v. Peterson ... , in its holding that a partner cannot commit theft
from the partnership." State v. Morales, 256 La. 940, 945, 240 So. 2d 714, 716 (1970).
See also Brinson v. Monroe Auto. & Sup. Co., 180 La. 1064, 158 So. 558 (1934); Smith
v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319 (1848).
29. Ordinary partners are liable only for their virile share of the debts of the
partnership. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2873. Commercial partners are liable in solido for the
debts of the partnership. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2872.
"The court in the Peterson case seems to have based its decision on the fact that
each partner in a commercial partnership can be held liable for the entire debt of the
partnership. This implies that a different result might be reached in a case involving
the misappropriation of property belonging to an ordinary partnership by one of the
partners, since ordinary partners are liable only for their virile share of the debts of
the partnership. Whether the partnership is commercial or ordinary, the practical and
legal considerations are essentially the same, and it is highly doubtful that such a
distincition will be made or could be justified." The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court of the 1956-1957 Term-Criminal Law & Procedure, 18 LA. L. REV. 119, 122
(1957).
30. Leger v. Townsend, 257 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
31. E.B. Hayes Mach. Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 84 So. 898 (1920).
32. "[Wlhile the ultimate liability of partners is in solido,-i.e. joint and sev-
eral,-they, during the life of the partnership, cannot be charged individually except
through the partnership; that is, during the life of the partnership a partner is ...
liable and made to respond individually only through a judgment against the intellec-
tual being of which he is a component part. . . . [Tihe proposition of law here
NOTES
The Louisiana courts of appeal, apparently reluctant to impose
tort liability on the partner in addition to compensation liability on
the partnership, have molded a rule that the partner is not a third
party under the Workmen's Compensation Act unless he is an em-
ployee of the partnership. Such a rule cannot be reconciled with the
Louisiana entity theory of partnership under which an employee is
properly employed by the partnership entity rather than the partner.
The partner is a third party regardless of any employee status he
might have with the partnership, and the employer's immunity under
the Workmen's Compensation Act should properly attach to the part-
nership rather than the partner. By changing their positions in Leger,
Cockerham and Bersuder, the courts could remain faithful to the
entity theory by holding that the partner, like the corporate officer,
is a third party. Since the overruling of Peterson, the partner and the
corporate officer may not be distinguished by the mere fact that the
primary obligation of the partnership is also the secondary obligation
of the partner.
Randy J. McClanahan
NONRESIDENT TUITION: CHIPPING AWAY AT THE BLOCKADE
In Vlandis v. Kline,' two University of Connecticut students
challenged a Connecticut statute2 that irreversibly classified them as
nonresidents for the entire period of their attendance at the univer-
sity. Claiming that they were bona fide residents of Connecticut, the
students argued that the state's statutory definition of residence for
tuition purposes violated their constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection. The United States District Court held the stat-
ute invalid and granted injunctive relief.3 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the due process clause
forbids classification based on:
presented must be maintained as resulting from our peculiar law, though it would be
true in no other state of the Union. Elsewhere the partners are always individually
liable, and the partnership as a distinct being cannot be cited. In Louisiana, during
the existence of a commercial partnership, it alone can be sued for a partnership debt,
and the citation may be served upon the firm by service upon the partner." Liverpool,
Brazil & River Platte Nay. Co. v. Agar & Lelong, 14 F. 615 (Circuit Court, E.D. La.
1882).
1. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-329b, as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 126
(1971).
3. Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972).
19741
